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A Consumer Warning for the Restatement of
Employment Law: READ CAREFULLY BEFORE
APPLYING
Matthew W Finkin*
On May 19, 2009, the membership of the American Law
Institute (ALI) voted to approve the Restatement of the Law
(Third) of Employment Law,' Chapters one, two, and four, subject
to the approval of remaining Chapters not yet drafted, rejecting a
motion to defer for further study. About two weeks before the vote,
the ALI administration distributed an informational circular to its
members that included the following terse announcement: "A
group of academics called the Labor Law Group has generated an
extensive set of comments on the Employment Law draft and has
requested we inform members that those comments are available at
http://www.law.tulane.edu/LaborLawGroupALIDocs.aspx."
This dry notice barely hints at the depth of the underlying
controversy or of what is at stake in it.
The "group of academics" referred to, about thirty in number,
are all specialists in labor and employment law. They form the
membership of an organization founded more than fifty years ago,
at the urging of then professor (later Secretary of Labor) Willard
Wirtz, to modernize the teaching of labor law and, today, of
employment law as well. The Group's members engage in
collaborative efforts to produce casebooks and other teaching
materials attuned to the latest economic, social, and legal
developments. The Group thus mirrors the ALI as a self-selected,
self-perpetuating educational body differing in one key regard:
whereas the ALI from its founding eschewed any role in labor
law-until, that is, it launched its Restatement project in 2003-
labor and employment law is the sole focus of the Labor Law
Group.
The Group's critique of the Restatement, prepared by working
committees assigned to each subsection of the then current draft of
September 2008, was presented at a conference at the Hastings
College of Law in January 2009. Each Restatement subsection and
the respective working committee's critique of it was taken up,
analyzed and debated, and the critique redrafted as needed in light
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of that discussion. Although the ALI's Reporters were invited to
attend, none did. Instead, the Group's report was submitted to the
ALl, and in its wake a few small changes were made by the
Reporters in the final draft: some superseded or misstated cases
were omitted, some neglected cases were mentioned, few stylistic
changes were made; but, in all essentials the Group's critique was
ignored, its request to broaden the ideological complexion in the
cohort of Reporters was brushed aside, and the draft was adopted.
Whence this warning to the judiciary, the ultimate consumers
of the ALI's product: Read Carefully Before Applying. This
injunction is not directed to the Restatement. It needs no attention
called to it as it surely will be cited by counsel, especially by
counsel for employers, and attention having been drawn to it, it
will surely be read by the courts. No, this consumer alert calls
attention to the Group's critique, which the ALI chose in substance
to ignore.2 That document should be read, and read carefully
before the courts choose to apply what the Restatement advises. It
supplies a strong corrective-academically rigorous, painstakingly
researched, and powerfully argued-that should give pause before
the courts uncritically assume that the ALI's good housekeeping
seal of approval means that the Restatement will be good for the
health of society.
All the many points of specific criticism made by each of the
working parties need not be rehearsed here. Professor Kenneth
Dau-Schmidt's introductory to the Group's report does a splendid
job of that. But out of the welter of detail (and the devil is in the
details) a single, dominant theme will emerge in stark relief: at
almost every critical juncture, where the courts are divided or
where there is room for the law to grow, the Reporters opt for the
approach more solicitous of employer interests or less open to legal
development; they do this with a high degree of indifference to
either doctrinal faithfulness or consistency with existing
Restatements; and, critically, they decline at every point to engage
with the published criticism, perhaps on the esoteric assumption
that if they do not acknowledge the Restatement's tendentiousness
no one will notice it.
I will single out just three subsections to illustrate the point. I
have chosen these out of so many others not due to any special
salience but simply because I had worked through two of them in
contemplating yet an earlier draft3 and worked on the third as a
2. The Group's product has been published at 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y
J. 1-207 (2009) [hereinafter Group Report].
3. Matthew Finkin, Shoring Up the Citadel (At-Will Employment), 24
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMp. L. J. 1 (2006).
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member of the Group's working party; that is, simply because I am
more familiar with that terrain to craft this warning notice in the
immediate wake of the ALI's vote.
I. TENDENTIOUS AND UNRESPONSIVE: THREE ILLUSTRATIONS
A. Revocation of Policies Assuring Job Security
The prior draft of the Restatement held that the promulgation of
an employer policy that expressly assured employees of job
security provided a legitimate basis to require an employer to
observe those terms. As this is in keeping with the result in most
jurisdictions the Reporters could scarcely do less. But the legal
basis they gave for that result was unusual. The Reporters'
comments to the September 2008 draft observed first that "some
courts ' 4 have applied implied contract theory while others have
applied promissory estoppel to bind employers by their policies.
The Reporters found neither persuasive and opted instead for
"administrative estoppel," a doctrine borrowed from federal
administrative law. The Reporters' Comment explained:
Such [policy] statements are analogous to rules of practice
promulgated by administrative agencies to govern their
operational decisions; as a matter of administrative law,
such rules are held binding on the agency until properly
modified or revoked on a theory of "administrative agency
estoppel" even though no statute or regulation may have
required their promulgation in the first place. By the same
token, unilateral employer statements that, reasonably read
in context are intended to govern operational personnel
decisions should be binding on the employer until properly
modified or revoked. 5
On behalf of the Labor Law Group, Professor Steven Befort,
noting that a clear majority of courts (not "some courts") had
applied implied contract to reach that result, commented on the
draft's alternative theory thusly:
The analogy to administrative agency estoppel may be
subject to at least two criticisms in the context of employer
policy statements. First, no jurisdiction has adopted
administrative agency estoppel as the underlying rationale
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW at 84 (Tentative Draft
No. 2) (Sept. 24, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Draft].
5. Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
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for enforcing employer policy statements. As such, the
draft Restatement here again proposes to change rather than
to restate or clarify existing law.
Second, it is not clear that the rules governing
administrative agency procedure are comparable in nature
to the rules governing the substance of the employment
relationship. While a procedural rule in an agency context
serves to provide guidance on the process of how an agency
intends to determine substantive rights going into the
future, a promissory statement made in the context of an
ongoing employment relationship itself directly establishes
the substantive rules governing that relationship. In some
employment contexts, such as in the realm of procedural
due process rights afforded by the Constitution to public
employees, an employer's unilaterally promulgated rules
and even practices have been found to be binding and not
subject to unilateral alteration.6
In other words, the analogy will not hold up. A public agency
that promulgates a rule assuring its employees that they will not be
dismissed except for just cause cannot unilaterally revoke that rule
and then treat those employees who had been governed by it as at-
will employees: the rule creates a property interest in the job that
may not be abrogated unilaterally.
7
How does the final draft respond to this? It does not. The text
remains unchanged; the criticism passes unnoticed.
There is no doubt that the Reporters want employers to have
the ability unilaterally to revoke commitments to job security that
they no longer find expedient to observe. And though that is the
result realized in a majority of jurisdictions, the reasoning in these
cases is rather difficult to square with either implied contract or
promissory estoppel; whence the contrary result reached by those
courts that have disallowed unilateral abrogation.
Professor Befort points out that the courts in those several
jurisdictions have required assent and consideration in order to
abrogate an employee's job security guaranteed by prior policy.
This the Reporters did consider worthy of response, by expanding
their Comment to claim there to be a lack of clarity in some of
those cases. They go on then to reiterate the language of the prior
6. Group Report, supra note 2, at 132.
7. E.g., Saxe v. Bd. of Trustees of Metro. State Coll. of Denver, 179 P.3d
67 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007) (court remanded for a determination of whether certain
incidents of job security afforded under the agency's prior rule had vested, e.g.,
priority of retention in staff reduction, there being no dispute that the entitlement
to job security itself could not be abrogated unilaterally).
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draft: "This Restatement therefore rejects the position of those
courts that seemingly would require employees formally to agree to
any change in terms that employees enjoyed under prior unilateral
statements-irrespective of whether the prior statement created
vested or accrued rights .... The "therefore" is misleading for
no reasoning precedes it: it announces the Reporters' rejection as a
fact, without explanation. What about the rest?
"Seemingly" require employee agreement? This is what the
Illinois Supreme Court said in the case the Reporters cite:
[A]fter an employer is contractually bound to the
provisions of an employee handbook, unilateral
modification of its terms by the employer to an employee's
disadvantage fails for lack of consideration. This was the
view adopted by the appellate court below, and a number of
other courts have also relied on this reasoning in rejecting
efforts by employers to unilaterally modify handbook terms
or other personnel policies to the disadvantage of existing
employees and in the absence of a reservation of the right
to do so. Applying well-established principles of contract
law, these courts have held that modifications to terms and
provisions of employee handbooks cannot apply to existing
employees in the absence of consideration. Moreover, these
cases have held that the requisite consideration for a
modification that would operate to an employee's
disadvantage is not supplied simply by the employee's
continued work for the employer. That is to say, in addition
to an offer and acceptance, consideration must be found
elsewhere, whether in the form of a new benefit to the
employee or a new detriment to the employer, or as the
product of mutual agreement.
9
"Irrespective" of whether job security had vested or accrued?
That assertion makes sense only if the Reporters' ipse dixit-that a
commitment to job security does not vest or accrue-is sound. But
as that say-so rests on nothing other than that they say so, that
pronouncement, too, passes undefended, as if it were a self-evident
truth. In Illinois and like jurisdictions it is not. To these courts, as a
contractual commitment to job security is, by definition, a
contractual commitment, it cannot be terminated unilaterally and
there is nothing "seeming" or "irrespective" about it.
8. RESTATEMENT (2009), supra note 1, at 98 (emphasis added) (citing
Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d 1140, 1144-46 (I11. 999).
9. Doyle, 708 N.E.2d at 1145 (emphasis added).
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Were the Restatement to opt for one or the other of the
accepted doctrines, unilateral contract or promissory estoppel, the
Reporters would have had to engage with the societal implications
of allowing unilateral abrogation, foreshadowed by the doctrinal
obstacles to it, i.e., the want of consideration under unilateral
contract or detrimental reliance under promissory estoppel. This is
how the Reporters' Comment in the prior draft grounded the result:
Employers make certain unilateral statements regarding
personnel policy for the purpose of governing the
operational decisions of their supervisors and managers.
Employers do so in their self-interest and for their benefit
in order to advance productivity, employee welfare, or
some other organizational objective. Absent language in the
statement to the contrary, the employer's purpose in
promulgating a unilateral policy statement is to have it
govern operational decisions while the statement is in
effect, but not to bind the employer to adhere to the policies
in the statement after giving reasonable notice to employees
of changes in those policies.' 0
This is as close as the Reporters came to defending their
choice: that as the employer is the master of its policies, and as it
promulgates its policies to advance its economic interests, it is free
to abandon them when it no longer sees the benefit to be gained,
when it no longer believes that its interests are being served. In
other words, if an employer believes that it will no longer gain
productivity by assuring its employees the job security it
previously had assured them, so be it for the employees. But,
insofar as we are talking about "general estoppel principles," the
very foundation they lay for their approach, would not the
employees' reliance interest have to be factored in, somewhere?
The final draft declines to address this point. The rationale is
retained. No mention is made of the employees' interests nor, for
that matter, of the rule in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
requiring contracts to be construed against the interests of the
drafting (presumably the dominant) party.ll
In other words, the Reporters borrow a legal theory appearing
nowhere in the law of employment and then misapply it for a
10. 2008 Draft, supra note 4, at 85 (emphasis added).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981). Presumably,
though by their silence it is hard to tell, the Reporters find the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts to be inapposite because they stand on an analogy to
administrative law, not on contract law, an adroit arabesque which avoids the
inconvenience of § 206, though not the policy supporting it.
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tendentious purpose without explaining why that is the socially
preferable result. As employers can avoid the problem altogether
by declining to give assurances of job security, this subsection may
have rather limited practical impact going forward. But the
Reporters' treatment is instructive nonetheless for it displays both
the thrust of the project and its methodology.
B. Discharge in Violation of Public Policy
The working committee's report on this chapter is extensive
and detailed. Focusing for the moment only on the effort to define
when public policy is violated, by setting out clusters of cases, the
working committee's members, Professors Richard Bales and
Roberto Corrada, observe that even as the text "captures the nature
of activities" protected, a substantial group of activities are
missing. This dovetails with the working committee's overall
conclusion that:
Although some value exists in merely stating the consensus
respecting these rules, the mission of the ALI extends
beyond that, to better adapt the law to social needs and
secure the better administration of justice. Our principal
problem with the current Restatement draft is that it does
not adequately recognize the dynamic nature of this area of
law and uses language which some lawyers and judges
(assuming the proposed Restatement has some impact) may
interpret to foreclose further development.12
Let us see how this plays out in just one small comer of the
codification of case clusters. The Restatement would extend
protection to an employee discharged for claiming a benefit or
filing a charge under an employment law. The Reporters' Comment
to the prior draft made clear that the purpose of the tort is to blunt
"the ability of employers to use economic pressure to undermine
the willingness of employees to claim employment benefits or, 13
rights to which they are entitled. That protection extends no
further. As a result, employers would be allowed to discharge
employees for claiming benefits or exercising rights vis-A-vis their
employers that are not grounded in employment. May an insurance
company discharge an employee who is also a policy holder
because she is considering suing it for an entitlement she believes
is due her under her policy? An Ohio court held that that discharge
12. Group Report, supra note 2, at 159.
13. 2008 Draft, supra note 4, at 136 (emphasis added).
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would violate public policy. 14 May a bank discharge employees
who refuse to vote their stock in the bank as management orders
them to? The Supreme Court of Virginia held that that discharge
violated public policy.' 5 As none of these employees claimed or
exercised an employment-based right, to the ALI their discharges
would not be actionable. Consequently, the Labor Law Group's
working committee urged an amendment making it clear that
"public policy is broad enough to protect employees [from
retaliation by their employer for] seeking benefits outside of the
employment relationship." 16 In response, no change was made in
the text nor did the Reporters choose to come to grips with the
criticism-to explain why they think the Ohio and Virginia courts
had erred, why the use of economic pressure to deprive employees
of rights or benefits would be actionable in the one situation but
not in the other.
In one of the few passages recognizing the capacity of the law
to grow, this section of the Restatement does close out with an
open-ended category allowing for the creation of torts not set out
in any of its preceding case clusters. But, because the Reporters
foreclose a cause of action for retaliation where a non-employment
based right is asserted against the employer, that avenue for the
growth of law is foreclosed, without explanation or defense.
In any event, all may not be lost for the hapless insurance clerk
and bank teller. As their employers have so obviously overreached,
so obviously acted unfairly and unreasonably, these employees
surely would be protected by the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing as set out in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
would they not?17 The answer the Reporters give is "no."
C. The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The prior draft asserted that the covenant does apply to at-will
employment, but that it nevertheless must be read as "consistent"
with the at-will rule. It then set out two and only two case
categories where the covenant would apply: a discharge to avoid
the vesting of a right or benefit and a discharge for doing an act
authorized by the employer. Note that as the ground of discharge
of our employee-insured and our employee-stockholder fall under
14. Moskowetz v. Progressive Ins. Co., 811 N.E.2d 174 (Ohio Misc. 2d
2004).
15. Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1985).
16. Group Report, supra note 2, at 187.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
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neither of these heads, they could not claim a breach of good faith
or fair dealing.
The critique of this section concluded that many of the defects
described by the Labor Law Group's working committee as
characteristic of the entire Restatement were particularly evident
here: "[T]he want of depth in scholarship; the lack of conceptual
coherence; the absence of analysis, of any reasoned explanations
for the choices it makes; and the blunting effect of the blackletter
rules it proposes on the potential for the growth of law."'' 8
In response, the Reporters did address the thinness of
scholarship by mentioning seven additional cases, including one
from Alaska, a jurisdiction that has taken a broad approach to the
application of the covenant but whose law had been omitted in the
prior draft. The Reporters also added the words "if not earlier" to
the statement that the seeds of the covenant were planted in a
famous New York decision of 1917-this in response to the
critic's pointing to the roots of the doctrine in Roman, medieval,
and modem German law, 19 which deeper roots, however, continue
to remain unmentioned. So the want of "depth of scholarship" was
disposed of by adding three words and a handful of case citations.
As for coherence, the Reporters maintain that the covenant
must be "consistent" with the at-will rule. But the at-will rule, as
they set it out in an earlier provision, is merely a default rule or a
presumption governing duration of employment. In that earlier
part, the Reporters do not maintain that employers must be free to
discharge for any reason, let alone a morally squalid, unfair, or
indecent reason not otherwise violative of law. That notion is
insinuated here. Consequently, the two blackletter rules the
Reporters set out-that employers must observe a duty of fair
dealing which must be applied consistent with the employer's
power to discharge unfairly-simply cannot be reconciled.
As the Group's working committee's critique pointed out, the
two categories the Restatement sets out as being "consistent" with
the at-will rule are consistent by virtue of these obligations being
tacit contractual limits on the power to discharge, i.e., by
promising the benefit or authorizing the act the employer will have
tacitly promised, "I will not fire you to avoid paying the benefit or
for doing the act." This contractual consequence does not require
any notion of good faith or fair dealing to be implied.
Good faith and fair dealing comes into play, according to the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, when the contracting
party acts indecently or unreasonably as gauged by community
18. Group Report, supra note 2, at 133.
19. See infra note 21.
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standards. This was not accepted by the Reporters in the prior
draft. They noted that some jurisdictions had applied the covenant
to discharges grounded in fraud or deceit, but they rejected that
application. The final draft also notes those cases, but now it adds
to that reference the statement, "these courts, too, interpret the
covenant consistently with the at-will rule."20 The final draft then
omits the prior Comment's observation that it "disagrees with" the
broader implication to that effect in an early New Hampshire
decision, which case reference remains but now barren of
comment. That is where the Reporters' commentary leaves it, and I
leave it to the reader to figure out what these editorial changes
mean.
But the blackletter rules continue just as before. Unlike the
treatment of public policy, which includes a final category that
acknowledges at least that other categories of protection might yet
emerge, such an open-ended invitation to the growth of the law is
notable here by its absence.
As a discharge of an at-will employee based upon fabricated
evidence, or the discharge of one employee for the very same
conduct that is condoned when engaged in by a second employee,
falls into neither of the two prohibitions the draft sets out, these
discharges could not be in breach of good faith or fair dealing as
the Reporters see it. The former would be actionable in Delaware,
as the prior draft noted, but now the draft notes that that
application to that court is "consistent" with the at-will rule.2' The
Reporters decline to say that a duplicitous discharge would be in
breach of the covenant as they see it, and were it to be so the
blackletter rule would say so, which it does not. The latter, an
application of the principle of industrial justice that like discharge
cases must be treated alike, would be actionable in Alaska, for
breach of good faith and fair dealing. The Reporters now note that
that is so as well, but here without any further comment, that is,
without even suggesting that that, too, would be "consistent" with
the at-will rule in the eyes of Alaska's courts.
All this in the name of the Restatement's declared purpose: to
clarify and simplify as well as modernize the law. But there is
nothing clear or simple in the Reporters' commentary. And the
rules they lay down are scarceA modem as measured by the ALI's
own Restatement of Contracts.
20. RESTATEMENT (2009), supra note 1, at 104.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Neither do the Reporters care to take note of the increasing judicial use
of the covenant in other countries in the common law orbit--the United
Kingdom, Australia, or Israel-adverted to by the working committee. This is in
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II. THE HUMAN DIMENSION
It remains still to be seen whether employment law, more
particularly only that comer composed of the common law, is fit
for "restatement." The volatility and disputatiousness of the subject
alone argues that it is not, as several members of the Labor Law
Group's working party concluded. But if it is fit to be restated, how
is it that after five years of drafting and review within the ALI so
flawed a product could emerge and, when faced with serious and
sobering criticism, be rushed to adoption? How could the ALI
believe that no possible benefit could be derived from a thoughtful
engagement with the collective judgment of a body that surely
cannot be rejarded as lacking in competence, experience, or
judiciousness? 3 This touches upon a sensitive matter captured in
the Labor Law Group's appeal to the ALI:
Although the reporters that the ALI currently has working
on the project are all talented academics, we feel that they
are unduly dominated by the employer perspective. The
Chief Reporter, Sam Estreicher, is a talented academic
whose work is strongly identified with employer interests
and who works "of counsel" for a management firm. Andy
Morriss is also very talented, and perhaps the strongest
supporter of the "at will" doctrine in the academy. Either
because of perspective, experience or time commitments,
there is no current reporter who can act as an effective
counter-balance to these perspectives. Consistent with
common practice in labor and employment law, we feel
that at least two new reporters should be appointed, one
keeping with the Restatement's tacit rejection to resort to international law as a
source of public policy in the employment relationship, another point made by
the Group with which the Reporters decline to engage. But the absence of
foreign reference is especially surprising here for, as the working committee
pointed out, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was taken into the law in
the United States by borrowing from German law via the Uniform Commercial
Code.
23. The members of the Labor Law Group's working committee included
Theodore St. Antoine, former dean of the University of Michigan Law School
and the moving force behind the Model Employment Termination Act project of
the Commissioners for Uniform State Law; Joseph Grodin of the Hastings
College of Law and former Associate Justice of the California Supreme Court;
and Dennis Nolan of the University of South Carolina Law School and former
President of the National Academy of Arbitrators. Of the thirteen other
participants, at least eight are co-authors of one or more casebooks, treatises,
and related teaching materials; they have extensive profiles of scholarly
publication, professional experience, and public service.
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with work identified with employee interests and one
clearly neutral, who are of equal authority with any of the
reporters currently on the project. Such a balancing of
perspective would undoubtedly improve the Proposed
Restatement and its claim on being a consensus view of the
law. We also feel that the reporters should be given time to
rework their drafts to take account of the views of the new
reporters and the comments of our Working Committees
before they receive final approval by the American Law
Institute.24
The call was rejected-without explanation or defense.
Whence the admonition: READ CAREFULLY THE CRITIQUE
BEFORE APPLYING THE RESTATEMENT.
24. Report from Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, President, Labor Law Group to the
Labor Law Group, May 7, 2009 (on file with author). The Restatement's Chief
Reporter, Professor Samuel Estreicher, is also the Director of the Center for
Labor and Employment Law at the New York University Law School. Of the
four other Reporters, one is the co-author of a casebook with Professor
Estreicher and two others are affiliated with his Center. In a fay moment one
might be tempted to term the ALI's project "Sam's Club."
204 [Vol. 70
